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Judgments are influenced not only by the content of rel-
evant information but also by the subjective experience 
of information processing. In particular, the experienced 
ease—or fluency—with which information is processed 
has an impact on a wide range of judgments. For exam-
ple, stimuli are liked better (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) and statements are more 
likely to seem true (e.g., Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 
1977; Reber & Schwarz, 1999) when their perception 
feels easy (perceptual fluency). Attitudes and social judg-
ments better reflect the content of recalled arguments or 
information when the recall is experienced as easy rather 
than difficult (retrieval fluency; for a review, see Wänke, 
2013). Besides perception and retrieval from memory, 
many other cognitive processes create feelings of fluency 
(of disfluency) that in turn influence processing out-
comes (for a review, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).
Reliance on fluency may be rational and adaptive 
because fluency represents a cue to the structure of the 
environment (Herzog & Hertwig, 2013). Thereby, experi-
ential states such as fluency have an informative value 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). We propose a twist to this cen-
tral assumption about metacognition, arguing that the 
current level of an experiential state may have less of an 
impact on judgments than its change from a previous 
level or deviance from an expectation.
At least two reasons prompt this hypothesis. First, cues 
have to be detectable. In order to be functional, they 
have to stand out against all the other stimuli in the exter-
nal and internal environment. Changes in experiences or 
deviations from what is expected in a given situation are 
likely to be particularly salient. Second, granting that the 
fluency cue serves an adaptive function in the environ-
ment, changes in experienced fluency that signal changes 
in the environment should be particularly relevant 
because environmental changes call for a new appraisal 
of the situation and may require a change of strategies. 
For both of these reasons—cue detectability and cue 
relevance— responding to changes in the experiential 
state should be most adaptive.
Importantly, such changes from a baseline may consti-
tute the deviation from one instant to another. An ongo-
ing task may suddenly require more or less effort than 
before, or a new task may impose different demands 
than the previous one. Moreover, the specific context 
may evoke an expectation. Imagine going to lift a heavy-
looking barbell. One would prepare for a heavy weight 
and might not think much about it if the actual lifting 
confirmed this expectation. But if lifting revealed that the 
barbell were a dummy made of light plastic, the resulting 
experience would be more noticeable. Merely appraising 
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Abstract
The subjective ease, or fluency, that is experienced during the cognitive processing of information has a large impact 
on the outcome of the processing. Research on judgment in a variety of domains shows that such fluency effects 
depend less on the (absolute) level of experienced fluency than on the relative fluency—that is, the change in fluency 
or the deviation from the expected level of fluency. Changes in an internal state are often more noticeable and perhaps 
more relevant as a diagnostic cue regarding the environment than the absolute level of that state. Relative experience 
is therefore particularly informative and accounts for ease-of-retrieval effects as well as classic fluency effects such as 
the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect.
Keywords
processing fluency, ease of retrieval, mere-exposure effect, truth effect
 at Universitaet Mannheim on July 22, 2015cdp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
196 Wänke, Hansen
a task or imagining doing it creates an idea of how easily 
one could do it. In fact, it has been shown that this 
expectancy suffices to elicit fluency effects. An advertis-
ing slogan that led individuals to expect that finding rea-
sons for buying a brand was easy rather than difficult led 
to more favorable attitudes toward that brand (Wänke, 
Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997). Such expectancies may be 
explicit or implicit—that is, the individual may or may 
not be consciously aware of measuring the experience 
against a standard (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996).
In sum, we argue that, in particular, changes from a 
baseline or deviations from an expected experience trig-
ger the use of fluency in judgments (for a review, see 
Hansen & Wänke, 2013).
Empirical Evidence for the Impact of 
Relative Versus Absolute Fluency
Relative fluency and familiarity
The first evidence that it is the deviation in rather than 
the (absolute) level of fluency that informs judgments 
was provided by Whittlesea and Williams (1998). They 
showed that feelings of familiarity emerged most strongly 
for stimuli that were processed more fluently than 
expected. Participants were asked to read aloud the items 
on a list of natural words (e.g., bottle) and nonwords 
(e.g., tlamnic) and to indicate which of the stimuli had 
been shown before. Words are visually more fluent than 
nonwords when merely read. However, some of the visu-
ally disfluent nonwords were surprisingly easy to pro-
nounce and sounded like real words when read aloud 
(e.g., phrawg, which sounds like frog). Although process-
ing latencies indicated that such pseudohomophones 
were less fluently processed than natural words, they 
were more likely to be erroneously “recognized” as hav-
ing been encountered previously in the experiment than 
natural words. Apparently it was not just high fluency 
that indicated high familiarity but fluency that was rela-
tively higher than expected based on spelling.
Relative fluency and attitude 
judgments
A classic finding in the fluency literature is that research 
participants report more favorable attitudes toward an 
issue after retrieving only a few favorable arguments for it 
compared with many favorable arguments (e.g., Wänke, 
Bless, & Biller, 1996). This pattern reflects that the retrieval 
of a few arguments is experienced as easy but the retrieval 
of many as more difficult (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, 
Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991). In several studies, 
we replicated this classic paradigm but used different pro-
cedures to manipulate whether the level of fluency was 
congruent or incongruent with experimentally controlled 
expectancies (Hansen & Wänke, 2008). In the most unob-
trusive manner, we semantically primed the concept of 
ease or difficulty and thereby created a standard (Studies 
1 and 2). We also directly manipulated expectancy (Study 
3). Participants were asked to generate either two (easy) 
or eight (difficult) arguments that were either in favor of 
or against the idea of allowing political voting via the 
Internet. This target task was the last in a series of five 
tasks. The four preceding tasks were presented in either 
an increasing or a decreasing order of difficulty. Doing 
four increasingly difficult tasks induced an expectation 
that the following fifth task would be even more difficult, 
whereas a decreasingly difficult order led participants to 
expect an easy final task. The actually experienced ease 
or difficulty when retrieving either two or eight argu-
ments, respectively, therefore either matched or mis-
matched participants’ expectations. Only when ease of 
retrieval mismatched the expectation did we obtain the 
typical ease-of-retrieval effect (i.e., in which participants 
reported more favorable attitudes after retrieving two 
rather than eight supporting arguments or less favorable 
attitudes after retrieving two rather than eight opposing 
arguments).
Relative fluency and truth judgments
In one of the most prominent fluency effects, the so-called 
truth effect, repeatedly presenting unfamiliar statements 
increases the likelihood that they will be believed to be 
true (e.g., Hasher et al., 1977). Repetition increases pro-
cessing fluency, which in turn is attributed to the state-
ments’ validity (for a more detailed explanation, see 
Herzog & Hertwig, 2013). In a test of the fluency account, 
Reber and Schwarz (1999) demonstrated that not only 
repetition but also visual fluency affects truth judgments. 
In this study, statements that were printed in colors with 
low contrast to the background (low perceptual  fluency) 
were rated as less likely to be true than statements in 
higher contrast that were easier to read (high perceptual 
fluency). In the same manner, we presented participants 
with a high- or a low-contrast statement but manipulated 
whether or not the contrast differed from that of a series 
of preceding statements (Hansen, Dechêne, & Wänke, 
2008). In line with the relative-fluency account, when the 
fluency of a statement deviated from the fluency of the 
preceding statements, the truth effect was replicated: 
High-contrast statements were rated as more likely to be 
true than low-contrast statements. No effect, however, 
emerged when the statement’s fluency (high or low) was 
similar to that of the preceding statements. These findings 
indicate that perceptual fluency informs judgments, par-
ticularly when the experienced fluency deviates from a 
“standard” experience.
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Relative fluency also accounts for the classic truth 
effect, whereby truth ratings of stimuli increase after 
repeated exposures: According to our assumptions, it is 
not merely the increase in fluency between the first expo-
sure and repeated exposures that increases perceived 
truth. Rather, for the truth effect to occur, the heightened 
fluency (due to repetition) needs to diverge from a cur-
rently present standard. A closer look at the standard 
experimental procedure reveals that such a low-fluency 
standard is characteristic of many pertinent studies. The 
standard procedure involves presenting a full list of state-
ments or stimuli at Time 1 and presenting some of these 
statements or stimuli (usually half) at Time 2. Importantly, 
at Time 2, the old items are intermixed with new items. 
The mix of old and new items creates differences in flu-
ency, which, according to our assumption, drives the truth 
effect. Supporting this assumption, a meta-analysis of 51 
studies on the truth effect revealed that differences in the 
perceived truth of old and new items at Time 2 were 
greater than truth differences for old items between the 
first and the second presentation (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, 
& Wänke, 2010). Apparently, the truth effect is a function 
of the increased perceived truth of repeated items and the 
decreased perceived truth of new items due to fluency 
differences. Most crucially, as shown in another study, 
repeated items were rated as more likely to be true only 
when they were intermixed with new ones; no truth effect 
was observed when the repeated items were presented 
alone (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009).
Relative fluency and the mere-
exposure effect
Similar to the truth effect, the mere-exposure effect 
occurs when repeatedly presenting previously unfamiliar 
stimuli increases liking—presumably as a result of the 
increased fluency of processing due to repetition (e.g., 
Bornstein, 1989). Again, the standard procedure involves 
presenting a mixed list of old and new stimuli at the test 
phase. As in our study on the truth effect, we compared 
the effects of repeated exposure with a mixed list versus 
a list of only repeated stimuli. Only when the old stimuli 
were mixed with new stimuli could the typical mere-
exposure effect be replicated: Repetition increased liking. 
When only old stimuli were presented, no increase in 
attractiveness ratings—compared with ratings of a con-
trol group—could be observed (Dechêne et al., 2009).
Relative fluency and moral judgments
Using the same paradigm of changes in figure-ground 
contrast as Hansen and colleagues (Hansen et al., 2008), 
Laham, Alter, and Goodwin (2009) found that descriptions 
of moral violations (for example, “A family eats its dead 
dog”) were rated as less morally objectionable when they 
were printed in high contrast and were preceded by 
descriptions printed in low contrast. No such difference 
occurred when the level of fluency did not change from 
that of the previous descriptions.
Does context affect the intensity of the 
experience or the use of the experience 
for judgments?
The reviewed evidence supports our assumption that a 
discrepancy between the actually experienced fluency 
and a standard informs judgments, including social judg-
ments. Our point is not that the context determines the 
intensity of fluency (or disfluency) like hot water makes 
lukewarm water feel cold by comparison. Rather, we pro-
pose that the context determines the diagnostic value of 
the experience. A change in the experiential state is usu-
ally more diagnostic than the current level of the experi-
ential state.
We grant that both conceptions (intensity vs. diagnos-
ticity) are difficult to disentangle and may not be com-
pletely independent of each other. We do not deny that 
the context may affect the perception of the experience. 
However, several findings speak against the notion of a 
mere change in the perceived intensity of the experience 
and support our notion concerning the diagnosticity of 
experiential changes. In the study described above 
(Hansen & Wänke, 2008; Experiment 3), participants 
reported similar (high) levels of experienced ease after 
the retrieval of two (rather than eight) arguments irrespec-
tive of whether the ease of the task was expected or sur-
prising. Likewise, they reported similar (and higher) levels 
of difficulty after the retrieval of eight arguments irrespec-
tive of expectations. Whereas self-reports showed that the 
context influenced whether the experienced level of ease 
or difficulty deviated from what was expected, it did not 
affect the intensity of the experience. Similarly, in the 
studies by Whittlesea and Williams (1998), familiarity was 
higher for pseudohomophones than for words despite the 
fact that the processing fluency of pseudohomophones 
was lower. Presumably, the deviance from the expectation 
was higher for pseudohomophones.
Additional evidence that context affects not merely the 
experience but the use of fluency has come from the 
studies by Dechêne and colleagues (2009) reported 
above. It seems unlikely that repetition did not lead to a 
more fluent processing of the stimuli when they were 
presented alone but did so only when they were inter-
mixed with new stimuli. It seems more likely that the 
intermix of old and new stimuli made the difference 
between fluent and less fluent stimuli more salient.
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Is it only relative fluency?
We do not claim that the level of experienced ease (irre-
spective of the context) is completely irrelevant for judg-
ments. Both changes in experiences and current states 
may of course be used as cues. Yet we would like to 
point out that there is less evidence for the impact of cur-
rent states than one might assume. Standard experimen-
tal procedures may mask the impact of change in favor of 
the impact of the manipulated state. Notably, the experi-
mental manipulation of the state always induces a change 
to a baseline or previous state. It is therefore an open 
question whether previous effects of an ease-of-retrieval 
or fluency manipulation were due to the manipulated 
state or rather to the change from a baseline (or the devi-
ation from a standard). For example, reading a text 
printed in a difficult-to-read font is both difficult in gen-
eral and also more difficult than one would expect when 
beginning to read a text. It should also be noted that in 
the classic ease-of-retrieval manipulation involving the 
retrieval of small versus large samples (Schwarz et al., 
1991), experiencing change is inherent in the procedure: 
Even in the difficult condition, the retrieval of the first 
items feels easy (in fact, just as easy as in the easy condi-
tion). But whereas participants in the easy condition dis-
continue before the experience changes noticeably, 
participants in the difficult condition experience a change 
from ease to difficulty with additional retrieval.
Conclusion
Response sensitivity to changes in a state rather than cur-
rent levels of that state is highly adaptive. Changes in the 
external world as well as internal states may signal that 
different behavioral strategies are needed to respond to 
the new situation. Moreover, changes foster detectability. 
Our perspective adopts these general mechanisms for 
predicting fluency effects. Numerous studies from our 
labs and others have shown evidence for the relative-
fluency account. This account holds implications for the 
emergence of such well-known phenomena as the ease-
of-retrieval, truth, and mere-exposure effects. From a 
broader perspective, this phenomenon need not be lim-
ited to the experience of fluency but may also hold for 
the psychological impact of other experiential cognitive 
states, such as moods or mind-sets, which may be a func-
tion of the relative change in, rather than the absolute 
level of, an experienced state.
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